


Peacebuilding Fund Emergency Window

Central African Republic : Inclusive Political Dialogue

July 2007

**BONUCA**



**UNDP**



**PEACEBUILDING FUND  
EMERGENCY WINDOW  
PROJECT DOCUMENT COVER SHEET**

<b>Recipient UN Organization:</b> UNDP, BONUCA	<b>National Ministry or other National Entity (if applicable)</b>
<b>Project Contact:</b> Sylvie More, Project Officer, Governance & Conflict Prevention Address: UNDP Central African Republic Telephone: +236 03 58 01 E-mail: sylvie.more@undp.org	<b>Project Title:</b> Inclusive Political Dialogue, Central African Republic
<b>Project Number:</b>	<b>Project Location:</b> Bangui, Central African Republic.
<b>Project Description:</b> An Inclusive Political Dialogue between the government, political parties, armed opposition groups and representatives of civil society is the essential next step in the consolidation of peace in the Central African Republic.  To facilitate this, the project will: 1. Support the extensive groundwork needed to facilitate frank and constructive discussions between the Government, opposition political parties and armed opposition groups, including a period of mediation by international facilitators and pre-dialogue for political and military leaders; 2. Fund a two to three week Inclusive Political Dialogue in Bangui	<b>Total Project Cost: \$831,975</b> <b>Peacebuilding Fund: \$801,975</b> <b>Government Input: \$30,000</b> <b>Other: N/A</b>  <b>Project Duration:</b>  Preparatory Phase: Three months Pre-Dialogues (political and military): 1 month Inclusive Political Dialogue: 3 weeks
<b>Main Goal and Key Immediate Objectives:</b> <i>Main Goal:</i> Support an Inclusive Political Dialogue leading to increased respect for democracy and decreased violence in CAR, to lay the foundation for a sustainable peace. <i>Immediate Objectives:</i> Facilitation of a preparatory phase for the Inclusive Political Dialogue by ensuring opportunities for government actors and opposition groups to air their grievances; Negotiations between Government and opposition groups; Creation of an open democratic space for dialogue between the different parties involved in the crises; Adoption of a road map for the implementation of the Syrte and Birao agreements and eventually, signing of peace agreement with the APRD and other rebel groups.	
<b>Key Activities and Outputs:</b> <i>Activities:</i> Negotiations between Government and opposition groups with the help of international mediators; Pre-dialogue (military and political) in Bangui; Two to three-week Inclusive Political Dialogue before the end of 2007 <i>Outputs:</i> Increased participation of opposition groups in civilian and political life; Restoration of State authority throughout the country; Respect for the outcome of the 2005 elections; Commitment to free and fair elections in 2010.	

On behalf of:	Signature	Date	Name/Title
Recipient UN Organization	<u>Thant</u>	<u>12 Sept 07</u>	<u>T LANZER RC/RR</u>
UN Representative	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>12 Sept 07</u>	<u>Lamine Cisse SRSG</u>
Head of PBSO	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>11 Sept. 07</u>	<u>CAROLYN McABKIE</u>

## COMPONENT I: SITUATION ANALYSIS

The Central African Republic (CAR) hovers: pinched between Darfur and Chad on the one hand, with an armed rebellion and a bankrupt government on the other. The combination of poverty, minimal state presence in much of the country, the meltdown of the security and justice systems and the destruction of social capital has led to the emergence of armed opposition groups, bandits and self-defense groups. There are frequent outbreaks of violence in CAR's northern regions. Civilians are regularly attacked and village burning has become routine. This has led to the displacement of almost 300,000 people and affected the livelihoods of an additional 700,000.

### 1.1 Recent Political History

Coup d'etats have characterized CAR's political history and no regime to date has been able to bring enduring stability to the country. The most recent crisis was provoked by a coup d'etat on March 15, 2003 when General François Bozizé overthrew then President Ange-Félix Patassé. A two-year transition culminated in May 2005 with free and fair elections that elected General Bozizé as President. The Group of the Wise, made up of six neutral and independent personalities, was created later that year to monitor the implementation of the Code of Conduct signed by political parties on the eve of the presidential elections. Since then the Group of Wise has been active in promoting dialogue between the government and opposition groups. The period of stability that followed the elections came to a sudden end in 2006 when armed opposition groups, made up mainly of supporters of former President Patassé and "ex-liberators" formerly associated with President Bozizé, aggrieved after he allegedly refused to fulfill his promises of financial compensation, began to proliferate in CAR's northeastern and northwestern provinces. Armed conflict escalated significantly in autumn 2006 with the takeover of Birao, the capital of the northeastern province of Vakaga, on October 30.

### 1.2 Armed Opposition

By the end of 2006, three opposition groups appeared to represent the strongest presence on the ground. The *Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et la Démocratie* (APRD) operating around Paoua in the north-west province of Ouham-Péndé claims to enjoy support from Patassé. In the central north, the *Front Démocratique pour le Peuple Centrafricaine* (FDPC) operates around Kabo. The *Union des Forces Républicaines* (UFDR) is an umbrella group for several armed groups made up of Chadian, Sudanese, and Central African fighters and is active in the north-east province of Vakaga. The UFDR has repeatedly pillaged the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), stealing weapons, vehicles and other resources. Numerous assaults on the main highways committed by bandit groups render trade difficult, and frequent attacks on rural communities, including hostage taking in order to demand ransoms, make livelihood production impossible in some areas, in particular in the far north-west.

### 1.3 Regional Influences

The Central African Republic's defense and security forces are factionalized, poorly trained and severely under-equipped; consequently, they are unable to protect either the population or the national territory. Their participation in the country's persistent crises, exacerbated by a climate of impunity, undercut the public's perception of the legitimacy of defense and judicial systems. In sum, the deficit in democracy, the weakness of the judiciary outside of Bangui, combined with the fragile security situation caused by armed conflict and internal tension, have permitted a

climate where serious human rights violations are committed, and go unpunished. There is a risk that if such impunity is allowed to continue, it will foster a spirit of vengeance in a society which is marked by the absence of a culture of dialogue and tolerance. If Inclusive Political Dialogue is to be successful in CAR, it is important to address these issues at the grass-root level.

In addition, regional politics and the security situation in neighboring countries further exacerbate CAR's proclivity towards conflict. Threats of violence spilling over from conflicts in Chad, Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo are ever present and small arms transfers across borders can go unchecked as fighters move between conflict-zones. Amongst the population there is little consensus about which security and military personnel are to be trusted. Until the Government is able to uphold the rule of law, and opposition groups are integrated into political and civil life, and the security and defense forces, CAR will undoubtedly continue down a path of conflict and underdevelopment.

#### *1.4 Security Council*

The view of the Security Council is that CAR's current crises cannot be resolved by military means and that the holding of an inclusive political dialogue along with continued efforts towards economic recovery are the only ways to reach peace. In light of this, BONUCA is undertaking a number of initiatives to encourage the Government of CAR to hold the dialogue, in line with the Group of Wise proposals.

#### *1.5 Conclusion*

The establishment of a framework for such dialogue between the government, political parties, armed opposition groups and representatives of civil society, is the essential next step in the consolidation of peace in CAR. This proposal seeks 874,619.61 USD to facilitate the preparatory phase and pre-dialogues (military and political) for an Inclusive Political Dialogue to be held before the end of 2007.

### **COMPONENT 2: PROJECT JUSTIFICATION**

#### *2.1 Rationale*

In November 2006 the Group of the Wise initiated a series of consultations to begin the process of negotiations with the armed opposition, and recommended to the President that he hold an all-inclusive political dialogue that included negotiations with rebel groups. On New Year's Day 2007, President Bozizé formally announced his intention to engage in such conversation.

##### *2.1.1 Peace Agreements and Negotiations*

The Government's negotiation and signing of two Peace Agreements in 2007 – with armed groups in the north and the northeast – suggests that CAR is committed to reform and stability. On February 2, 2007 the Government signed the Syrte agreement with Abdoulaye Miskine, leader of the *Front Démocratique pour le Peuple Centrafricain* (FDPC) and André Ringui, a former Minister of Patassé and close to Miskine. This agreement was open for signature to other rebel leaders, and called for an immediate ceasefire and for the fighters to lay down their arms. Regrettably its credibility was undermined not long afterwards when it was rejected by APRD and UFDR field commanders as it became clear that Miskine and Ringui held only minimal, if any, influence over APRD and UFDR troops.

A second breakthrough occurred however, when the Government signed a peace agreement with Zacharia Damane, the chief of staff of the *Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement* (UFDR) on April 13, 2007. The agreement contains provisions on ending hostilities, reintegrating UFDR combatants and granting amnesty to both leaders and fighters. The President established a Group of Contact to serve as a "follow-up committee to the agreement," and efforts have begun to implement the agreement.

The two peace agreements signed in 2007 contain provisions for a general amnesty, intended to cover all types of crimes and to benefit all belligerents ("blanket amnesty"). This sort of amnesty can institutionalize impunity. In order to reach the objectives of reconciliation, and to fight CAR's climate of impunity, the Inclusive National Dialogue could serve as an occasion to raise and discuss questions regarding amnesty, taking into account international conventions and norms on human rights

### *2.1.2 Political will for the Inclusive National Dialogue*

To date the most significant achievement of these agreements is the demonstration of political will, on behalf of both the Government and opposition groups, for constructive negotiation and for the stability of the country. In the wake of the Peace Agreements the President appointed Abdoulaye Miskine and Zacharia Damane to serve him as political councilors in compliance with provision # 5 of the peace agreements. In addition, the Government appointed Contact Group has engaged in negotiations with the APRD with a view to sign a peace agreement. Now the Government, with the support of neutral and impartial mediators, must increase dialogue efforts with other opposition groups operating in the country.

Indeed, the Government has reinforced its display of political will for Inclusive Political Dialogue in recent months, and on 12 August 2007, President Bozizé made a declaration in which he expressed his strong will to see this initiative come to fruition, starting, as foreseen in this proposal, with the establishment of a Dialogue Preparatory Committee. The first steps have in fact already been taken. On 22-24 August 2007 BONUCA and the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue organized a consultative meeting to prepare for the Dialogue. All stakeholders present at this meeting agreed on (i) the urgent need to organize and Inclusive Political Dialogue including armed groups, and (ii) the establishment of a Preparatory Committee, involving all stakeholders in the Dialogue.

Recognizing the current window of opportunity, the Group of Wise recently reaffirmed the need to proceed step by step to foster an inclusive political dialogue between the Government and all segments of society. Throughout the Central African Republic there is a growing consensus that an Inclusive Political Dialogue that brings together diverse actors – including the Government, opposition political parties, armed groups, civil society representatives and appropriate regional actors – is critical.

### *2.1.3 The United Nations in CAR*

Given the Government's confidence in the UN's activities and its strong country presence, the UN is well placed to facilitate the critical preparatory phase over the next four months culminating in an Inclusive Political Dialogue by late 2007. BONUCA, headed by SRSG Lamine Cissé (who is also Adviser member of the Group of Wise), has worked to encourage dialogue and reconciliation, provide electoral assistance, and help the Central African Republic enact military reforms, implement human rights policies, train civilian police, and disarm, demobilize

and reintegrate former fighters. UNDP is currently managing a range of projects which all work towards stabilizing the country and reducing conflict in CAR. These projects consist of reintegrating ex-combatants, improving relations between security and defense forces and local populations, controlling and reducing the proliferation of light weapons and strengthening traditional and modern judiciary systems. In addition, in his reports from 23 February and 10 August, the Secretary-General of the United Nations has proposed the deployment of a multidimensional presence to northeastern CAR inter alia to address the issue of spill-over from the conflict in Darfur and eastern Chad into the Vakaga region, and as called for by the CAR government.

## *2.2. Use of Funds*

### **The Peacebuilding Building Fund Emergency Window will:**

A. Support the extensive groundwork needed to facilitate frank and constructive discussions between the Government, opposition political parties and armed opposition groups. Establish a level of trust between actors that enables participants to safely and openly take part in the Inclusive Political Dialogue.

B. Fund a two to three week Inclusive Political Dialogue in Bangui, which will allow the Government and opposition groups to come together to air their views in order to overcome the crisis, enhance political stability and ensure CAR is able to hold peaceful democratic elections in 2010.

#### *2.2.1 Phase One: Mediation*

To facilitate the preparatory negotiations in advance of the Inclusive Political Dialogue two international facilitators/mediators will be appointed. They will be responsible for providing support to mediation between the Government and the leadership of the main political parties, armed groups and other stakeholders, and for providing negotiation and technical expertise to ensure effective participation in the Inclusive Political Dialogue. The facilitators will undergo extensive briefing with key national and international actors upon arrival in Bangui. They will then travel frequently between the capital and the northwest and northeast provinces to facilitate talks with all involved actors.

Putting a particular emphasis on including women in the talks, meetings will be held not only with armed groups and other political actors, but with communities. To this end, a series of provincial level meetings will be arranged, facilitated by the mediators, to feed the concerns of people in need into the national dialogue. Building on the idea of "conflict transformation" – turning existing factors of strife into triggers for progress - the key is to foster a spirit of consensus-building and dialogue in the communities that have been hardest hit by the current conflict. The already existing provincial peace building sub committees will be reinforced for the practical arrangements of these community-level meetings.

#### *2.2.2 Phase Two: Pre-dialogue*

In the next phase, representatives from participating parties (military and political) will gather for a one-month pre-dialogue, to lay the groundwork for the Inclusive Political Dialogue. During this phase, the Preparatory Committee, supported by the international facilitators/mediators, will draw on the achievements during the Mediation phase, to continue the dialogue with armed groups that have not entered into a peace agreement with the government, as well as political actors outside the country, to learn about their expectations on the Dialogue. This phase will



also be the occasion to give training to different political actors to build skills on constructive negotiation, and make sure that all actors are aware of the principles of tolerance and consensus-building that will guide phase three of the dialogue. Once this is accomplished, the Preparatory Committee will gather all stakeholders, including armed groups, to agree on the terms of the Dialogue, including the agenda, the venue, the participants, and the expected outcomes.

### *2.2.3 Phase Three: Inclusive Political Dialogue*

The extended negotiation period will culminate with a two to three week Inclusive Political Dialogue in Bangui in late 2007. At the conclusion of the dialogue, participating parties will commit to: an immediate end to violence; renunciation of violent means of coming to power; the inclusion of opposition groups in civilian and political life, and in the Central African Republic's Armed Forces; respect for the outcome of the 2005 elections; constructive and participatory work towards free and fair presidential elections in 2010; democratic media.

### *2.3 Risk of non-implementation of the project*

The immediate start of negotiations between the Government of CAR and opposition groups is critical. Even as the Government in Bangui makes strides towards opening dialogue with opposition groups, violence continues to affect hundreds of thousands of civilians in the north. In areas of Bangui, weapons circulate freely and there are constant stirrings of resistance to the current Government. Rebel groups are splintered and alliances fluid. A sustained, coordinated effort to provide space in which all relevant parties can air their grievances negotiate is the best way to reduce tension and enhance political stability. With international technical and financial support CAR will be able to successfully carry out the Inclusive Political Dialogue, and the critical preparatory negotiations.

The current moment presents a window of opportunity for the future stability and prosperity of CAR. Funding for an Inclusive Political Dialogue now could create a space within which the people who have been struck by violence in the past year can begin to rebuild their lives. A reduction of violence and tension in the north of the country will also improve access for humanitarian and development partners bringing urgently needed assistance to some one million people in need. On a country-wide level, a political dialogue to which all political actors are committed will ensure the political stability needed for reinforced collaboration with important developmental partners, such as the World Bank and the IMF, as well as bilateral partners.

Inversely, an ineffective or delayed response to CAR's need for an Inclusive Political Dialogue will lead to:

- A. Increased tension, the continuation of violence and entrenched instability.
- B. Continued displacement of communities in northern CAR, and further deprivation of access to livelihood production.
- C. Rising levels of cynicisms amongst the Central African population about the Government's commitment to the peace process and the international community's desire to support to the clearly expressed needs of the country to hold an Inclusive Political Dialogue.

### COMPONENT 3: OBJECTIVES, ACTIVITIES, OUTPUTS

Objectives	Measurable indicators	Means of verification	Important assumptions
<p><b>Development Objective:</b></p> <p>To organise an Inclusive Political Dialogue leading to increased respect for democracy and decreased violence in CAR, improving security for the civilian population in northern CAR and laying the foundations for a sustainable peace.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decrease in incidents of violence perpetrated against the civilian population in the northwest and northeast of CAR in the period following the conclusion of the Inclusive Political Dialogue.</li> <li>• Broad participation in free and fair elections in 2010.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Joint UN missions to the northeast and northwest to assess the security level in the field and see if there has been a reduction in violence and an improvement in the security situation of the civilian population.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The profile of armed opposition groups does not change dramatically, either in terms of new groups arriving on the political scene, or in terms of radicalization of existing groups.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Immediate Objectives:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dissipate tension by providing an open democratic space for dialogue between political actors, through a process of inclusive political dialogue, both at the regional level and in the capital, with input from local communities.</li> <li>• Increase respect for the results of the elections in 2005, and improve conditions for free and fair elections in 2010.</li> <li>• Increased participation of opposition groups in civilian and political life, and inclusion of some elements of former rebel groups in CAR's Armed Forces.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of meetings, facilitated by international mediators, with political actors and communities to allow them to air their grievances and build negotiation and consensus-building skills.</li> <li>• Ability of mediators and the Preparatory Committee to forge an agreement between participants on the terms of the Inclusive Political Dialogue.</li> <li>• Disarmament and integration of former rebel elements into CAR's armed forces.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Report by international mediators on the Inclusive Political Dialogue process, with quantitative evidence of number of meetings held, participants attending, and the work of the Preparatory Committee, as well as a qualitative analysis of how this process has contributed to the long-term objectives of the project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CAR's Government accepts the conditions placed by the opposition regarding the terms of the Political Dialogue and does not interrupt the process of dialogue and negotiation.</li> </ul>
<p><b>OUTPUTS:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Signature by all stakeholders of a statement at the close of the Inclusive Political Dialogue process, recognizing a commitment to democracy and the renunciation of violent means to acquire power.</li> <li>• Adoption of a roadmap for the implementation of existing peace agreements and signature of peace agreements with armed</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of participants in the Inclusive Political Dialogue who sign the closing statement.</li> <li>• Degree of implementation of existing peace agreements in the period following the Inclusive Political Dialogue.</li> <li>• Signature of further peace agreements with armed groups, notably with the APRD.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Joint UN missions to the field to assess implementation of existing and eventual new peace agreements.</li> <li>• Final report at the close of the Inclusive Political Dialogue drawing the conclusions on its impact.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• APRD accepts to sign a peace agreement.</li> <li>• UFDR and FDPC remain cohesive and committed to the agreements signed.</li> </ul>



groups that are not covered by the currently existing ones.			
<b>ACTIVITIES:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establishment of a Preparatory Committee, representing all stakeholders, to facilitate the organisation of an Inclusive Political Dialogue.</li> <li>One month pre-dialogue, facilitated by international mediators: meetings with political actors and communities in the provinces, to prepare the ground for the Inclusive Political Dialogue.</li> <li>Two to three-week Inclusive Political Dialogue in late 2007 in Bangui.</li> </ul>	<b>INPUTS:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Phase 1: Mediation (\$517,940)</li> <li>Phase 2: Pre-dialogue (\$65,392)</li> <li>Phase 3: Inclusive Political Dialogue (\$166,177.50)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Financial report</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Funding is made available to finance the work of the international mediators to catch the window of opportunity which currently exists.</li> </ul>

### 3.1 Objectives:

#### *Development Objective*

To organise an Inclusive Political Dialogue, leading to increased respect for democracy and decreased violence in CAR, improving security for the civilian population in northern CAR, and laying the foundations for a sustainable peace.

#### *Immediate Objectives*

1. Dissipate tension by providing an open democratic space for dialogue between political actors, through a process of inclusive political dialogue, both at the regional level and in the capital, with input from local communities
2. Increase respect for the results of the elections in 2005, and improve conditions for free and fair elections in 2010.
3. Increased participation of opposition groups in civilian and political life, and inclusion of some elements of former rebel groups in CAR's Armed Forces.
4. Commitment of all stake holders to free and democratic access of the public to the media.

### 3.2 Activities:

1. Negotiations between Government and opposition groups in Bangui and throughout the northwestern and northeastern provinces, facilitated by two international facilitators/mediators assisted by support staff.

2. Organisation of a series of provincial level meetings with local communities to ensure grass-root feed-back into the National Inclusive Political Dialogue.
3. Training and skill-building sessions concerning consensus-building and negotiation with various political actors across the country.
4. Establishment a Preparatory Committee including representatives of all parties to be forum for the organisation of the Inclusive Political Dialogue, with the assistance of the international facilitators.
5. Organisation of a one month pre-dialogue, as recommended by the Group of Wise, in late 2007.
6. Organisation of a two to three-week Inclusive Political Dialogue in Bangui in late 2007.

### **3.3 Outputs:**

1. Signature by all stakeholders of a statement at the close of the Inclusive Political Dialogue process, recognizing a commitment to democracy and the renunciation of violent means to acquire power.
2. Adoption of a roadmap for the implementation of existing peace agreements and signature of peace agreements with armed groups that are not covered by the currently existing ones.
3. Agreement by all stakeholders to establish a "Truth and Reconciliation Commission" (TRC).

**COMPONENT 4: BUDGET**

Category	Item	Unit	Unit Cost	Time Frame	Total Cost
<b>Phase One: Mediation</b>					
<i>Personnel</i>	<i>2 international mediators:</i>				
	Salary (D1/L6)	2	\$18,000.00	5 months	\$180,000.00
	Flight (R/T): Geneva-Bangui	2	\$3,000.00		\$6,000.00
	Per diem for one month	2	\$4,666.00	5 months	\$46,660.00
	Support Staff (G5)	2	\$820.00	5 months	\$8,200.00
	Driver (G2)	2	\$498.00	5 months	\$4,980.00
<i>Office</i>	Laptops	2	\$1,700.00		\$3,400.00
	Printers	1	\$700.00		\$700.00
	UPS	2	\$400.00		\$800.00
	Internet connection	1	\$1,870.00	5 months	\$9,350.00
	Internet installation	1	\$1,450.00		\$1,450.00
	Phones	2	\$200.00		\$400.00
	Thuraya satellite phone	2	\$2,000.00		\$4,000.00
	Phone Bills	2	\$2,000.00	5 months	\$20,000.00
<i>Transport</i>	Rental Land Cruiser (Moss compliant)	2	\$4,200.00	5 months	\$42,000.00
	Fuel	2	\$1,000.00	5 months	\$10,000.00
	Flight (charter): Bangui - Paoua	18	\$4,000.00		\$72,000.00
	Flight (charter): Bangui - Birao	18	\$6,000.00		\$108,000.00
<b>Phase One Sub-Total</b>					<b>\$517,940.00</b>
<b>Phase Two: Pre-dialogue</b>					
<i>Personnel</i>	Per diem for participants living in Bangui	15	\$6.00	30 days	\$2,700.00
	Per diem for participants from outside of Bangui	35	\$33.00	30 days	\$34,650.00
<i>Travel Costs</i>	Paoua-Bangui (ground transport)	18	\$54.00		\$972.00
	Birao-Bangui	17	\$110.00		\$1,870.00
<i>Catering</i>	Lunch and coffee during IPD	50	\$10.00	30 days	\$15,000.00
<i>Venue</i>	CEMAC		\$340.00	30 days	\$10,200.00
<b>Phase Two Sub-Total</b>					<b>\$65,392.00</b>
<b>Phase Three: Inclusive Political Dialogue</b>					
<i>Personnel</i>	Per diem for participants living in Bangui	50	\$5.25	21 days	\$5,512

	Per diem for participants travelling from outside of Bangui	150	\$31.50	21 days	\$99,225.00
<i>Travel Costs</i>	Paoua-Bangui (ground transport)	75	\$54.00		\$4,050.00
	Birao-Bangui (ground transport)	75	\$110.00		\$8,250.00
<i>Catering</i>	Lunch and coffee during IPD	200	\$10.00	21 days	\$42,000.00
<i>Venue</i>	CEMAC		\$340.00	21 days	\$7,140.00
<b>Phase III Sub-Total</b>					<b>\$166,177</b>
<b>Total I+II+III</b>					<b>\$ 749,509</b>
<i>HQ and Country Office Admin. Costs</i>	7% of Sub-Total				\$52,466
<b>Grand Total</b>					<b>\$801,975</b>
	<i>Note: All prices in USD</i>				

NB: CAR is a landlocked country with very poor trade routes. Costs for goods and services, such as internet and phone connections, are very high. As an example, outside of Bangui, Thuraya phones are the only reliable means of communication, which necessarily entails high communication costs. Availability of goods is also very limited, and UN agencies are in permanent short supply of office equipment and vehicles. In case international consultants would fail to bring their own material, it would very hard to find a back-up solution locally. This is the rationale behind including the cost for lap-tops, printers, UPS etc. in the present proposal, to avoid jeopardizing the timely completion of the Inclusive Political Dialogue process.

Due to the very limited travel options within CAR (no internal airlines exist to destinations in the north), the rental of vehicles, and flight travel, are indispensable to implement the aspects of the Dialogue that are to take place in the provinces.

## COMPONENT 5: MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

### 5.1 Management Structure

In close collaboration with BONUCA, UNDP will receive and manage the funds, and provide financial reports on the project's expenditures. The Center for Humanitarian Dialogue will act as the project's implementing partner and will be responsible for the hiring of the international facilitators/mediators and the substantive day to day follow-up of project activities. The choice of the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue to fulfill this role was determined by their large experience with negotiation and mediation, in countries such as, for example, Uganda, Burundi, Sudan, and the Republic of Congo. The Center for Humanitarian Dialogue also has broad policy expertise, in areas such as justice and peace-making and civilian protection, which makes it well placed to provide technical assistance to establish and lead the Dialogue Preparatory Committee, and to organize the Dialogue itself, in CAR.

An inter-organizational committee to ensure to neutrality and cooperation between participants will be made up of: 2 representatives from BONUCA, 2 representatives from UNDP, 2 representatives from the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, and 2 outside observers. The role of the two observers will be to back up the process, and give advice as necessary throughout the project period. The UN will work in partnership with Senior Councilor to the President, Stanislas Mbangot.

## *5.2 Project Duration*

Preparatory negotiations for the Inclusive Political Dialogue will last approximately three months. The Pre-dialogue with political and military leaders will last one month. The Inclusive Political Dialogue will last two to three weeks as determined after preliminary negotiations / assessments.

### **COMPONENT 6: MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

Project oversight, monitoring, reporting and evaluation will be done in accordance to the Peacebuilding Fund requirements, including the Status Report and the Final Project Report Outline. UNDP will complete monitoring and evaluation in coordination with BONUCA and the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue.

### **COMPONENT 7: RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS**

1. The APRD and other rebel groups may refuse to sign a peace agreement and to participate in the Inclusive Political Dialogue. They may also become more radical.
2. The Government may not accept certain conditions proposed by the opposition and stop the negotiation process.
3. If funds are not available in time, the process will be jeopardized.